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The Law Commission published its report on Expert Evidence in Criminal Proceedings in 
March 2011.1 Two years on, the government is still "considering its response"2 and there 
seems little immediate prospect that the Commission’s recommendations will be 
implemented, apparently because of anxiety over their possible cost.3  
For the foreseeable future, then, the courts may be left to develop the common law without 
legislative intervention. Judicial responses to the Consultation Paper indicated broad 
acceptance of the Law Commission’s view that the current "laissez faire" approach was 
unsatisfactory.4 Fortunately, or so I shall argue, the common law already provides the basis 
for a more rigorous approach: were the judges so minded, they could use their existing 
powers to achieve very similar results to those envisaged by the Law Commission. I use the 
subjunctive here because it is far from clear that the judges are so minded. However, while 
some recent Court of Appeal decisions have disappointed those hoping for a more rigorous 
approach to expert evidence,5 others have shown a refreshing willingness to scrutinise expert 
evidence critically, albeit with a view to controlling the terms in which it will be given, or in 
which it summed up to the jury, rather than excluding it altogether.6 Since, as we shall see, 
the likely effect of the Law Commission proposals would be largely seen in the editing rather 
than the complete exclusion of evidence, the Commission’s approach and that of the judiciary 
appear to be convergent.*Crim. L.R. 562   
Some critics of the Law Commission might say that this merely confirms that its 
recommendations would not give the common law the radical overhaul it needs. I shall argue, 
on the contrary, that the basic principles of the common law—a broad test of prima facie 
admissibility coupled with a power to exclude evidence whose potential prejudicial effect 
outweighs its probative value—are sound, however inadequately they have been applied in 
some cases. 
The Law Commission’s proposals  
The Law Commission’s proposed "core test" is that expert opinion evidence should not be 
admissible unless:  
(a) the opinion is soundly based; and 
(b) the strength of the opinion is warranted having regard to the grounds on which it is 
based.7  
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What is not immediately apparent from the wording of the Draft Bill, but emerges clearly 
from the Commission’s discussion, is that the "strength" of the opinion would be relevant to 
both limbs of the proposed test. A "weak" opinion, that is, may be "soundly based" on a 
scientific foundation that is too speculative or insufficiently tested to support a "strong" 
opinion. The Commission accepts, for example, that  
"a weak opinion based on ear-prints may well be sufficiently reliable to be admitted (under 
our proposed test) if the prosecution relies on the expert’s opinion merely to provide 
additional support for other cogent evidence of the accused’s guilt." 8  
In their critique of the Commission’s proposals, Edmond and Roberts rightly highlight the 
importance of this passage, which in their view reveals a serious weakness in the 
Commission’s proposals.9 The Commission’s "strength" test can, however, be seen as an 
ingenious attempt to avoid the drawback of the kind of rigid admissibility test favoured by 
Edmond and Roberts. The standard of "demonstrable reliability" that they propose for 
prosecution (but not defence) expert evidence is more demanding than that applied to any 
other kind of evidence,10 and would exclude relevant evidence that might form one strand of 
a case that was compelling as a whole. 
By relegating forensic techniques of uncertain reliability to a supporting role, the Law 
Commission’s test would mark a significant departure from some recent decisions of the 
Court of Appeal, particularly those that have upheld convictions based solely, or almost 
solely, on "facial mapping" evidence.11 The Commission’s*Crim. L.R. 563  critics are right, 
however, to point out that few forensic techniques would be likely to be excluded altogether 
under its recommendations.12  
Clause 4(2) of the Commission’s Draft Bill gives examples of when an expert opinion would 
not be soundly based. Although it is not clear from the wording of the Bill, the implication of 
the Commission’s analysis is that at least some of the tests set out in this clause would have 
to be considered in relation to how strongly the expert’s conclusions were expressed. For 
example, evidence would not be admissible if it was based on a hypothesis that had not "been 
subjected to sufficient scrutiny"13; but how much scrutiny is "sufficient" may depend on how 
much reliance the expert places on the hypothesis. A hypothesis that has been subjected only 
to limited scrutiny may justify a tentative opinion but not one that firmly excludes contrary 
hypotheses. Similarly, an opinion that relied on an "unjustifiable assumption", such as 
expressions of certainty based on unwarranted assertions of the discernible uniqueness of 
fingerprints,14 would often need to be rephrased in less dogmatic terms rather than excluded 
altogether. 
Turning to the "lower-order" factors15 listed in a schedule to the Draft Bill, a number of them 
amplify the requirement already present in the Criminal Procedure Rules for experts properly 
to qualify their opinions. The court should consider "whether the opinion properly explains 
how safe or unsafe" is any inference it draws; "whether the opinion takes proper account of 
matters, such as the degree of precision or margin of uncertainty, affecting the accuracy or 
reliability" of any results or measurements on which it relies; whether the report takes 
account of all relevant information; and whether the expert properly explains her stance in 
relation to any differences of opinion within the field or any departure from accepted 
practice. Other factors depend on "the extent to which" the material relied upon by the expert 
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has been peer-reviewed or fall outside the expert’s field.16 These are matters of degree and 
must, presumably, be considered in the context of the strength of the proposed opinion. 
The Common Law  
Currently, the admissibility of expert evidence is governed by the same general principles 
that apply to any other kind of evidence. These are, firstly, that evidence is prima facie 
admissible if it is relevant to a matter in issue17 and of more than minimal probative value, so 
that it could affect a reasonable jury’s decision18; and secondly, that prosecution evidence19 
that is prima facie admissible may be excluded if its potential prejudicial effect outweighs its 
probative value20 (this is often subsumed under the statutory discretion to exclude prosecution 
evidence on the*Crim. L.R. 564  grounds of unfairness).21 In addition, there is at least one 
common law rule that is specific to expert evidence, the "Turner rule".22 The exact nature of 
this rule is a matter of some debate23 but it sets a standard of helpfulness that expert evidence 
must meet in order to be exempted from the general rule against opinion evidence.24 The 
Turner rule allows the courts to exclude evidence, including defence evidence, which 
although relevant and of more than minimal probative value, is insufficiently "helpful" to the 
jury to offset the general objection to opinion evidence: namely the risk that the jury will be 
unduly influenced by the witness’s opinion about a matter on which they ought to form their 
own independent judgment. 
The Law Commission gave much more attention to the first and last of these principles than 
to the second. In particular, it attempted to elucidate the ill-defined "plus-value"25 beyond 
bare logical relevance which was summarised above in the phrase that evidence must be of 
more than minimal probative value. The Commission rightly concluded that this rule was of 
very limited assistance in excluding unreliable expert evidence, and proceeded to formulate 
its own more rigorous test of when evidence is "sufficiently reliable to be admitted".26 The 
discretion to exclude prosecution evidence on the ground of prejudicial effect or unfairness 
receives no more than passing mention in the report. Arguably this is a fair reflection of the 
limited practical importance of the exclusionary discretion—so far as I am aware, there is no 
English appellate decision27 holding that expert evidence ought to be excluded on these 
grounds, although there are of course a number of decisions excluding defence evidence 
under the Turner rule.28 The potential importance of the exclusionary discretion, however, is 
considerable. 
Rose L.J.’s endorsement in Luttrell of Cross and Tapper’s view that expert evidence should 
be subject only to the "ordinary tests of relevance and reliability"29 was combined with a 
reminder to judges that they must also use their discretion at common law and under PACE 
s.78 in deciding whether to admit expert prosecution evidence.30 In the edition of Cross and 
Tapper cited in Luttrell, the only authority cited in support of this view is the Canadian case 
of Mohan, where the Supreme Court held that the common-law tests of admissibility 
incorporate a "reliability versus effect factor", which can be regarded either as an aspect of 
relevance or as a distinct exclusionary rule, and which has "special significance in assessing 
the admissibility of expert evidence".31 In Reed, the court quotes the corresponding passage 
in the 11th edition of Cross and Tapper, which cites*Crim. L.R. 565  additional Canadian 
authorities including J.-L.J., where the Supreme Court interprets Mohan as "moving in 
parallel" with the US Daubert test.32 The Reed judgement goes on to cite the Law 
Commission’s "valuable discussion" of Daubert in its Consultation Paper, in a way that could 
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be taken to imply that courts should take this discussion into account in considering whether 
expert evidence has "a sufficiently reliable scientific basis … to be admitted".33 Though it is 
doubtful whether the Court of Appeal appreciated the Canadian context of Cross and 
Tapper’s remarks, there is nothing in its endorsement of them to preclude the development of 
a more rigorous approach to the reliability of expert evidence than the court has displayed so 
far. 
In Buckley,34 a leading case on fingerprint evidence, Rose L.J. clearly distinguished between 
the test of relevance and the exclusionary discretion:  
"Fingerprint evidence, like any other evidence, is admissible as a matter of law if it tends to 
prove the guilt of the accused. It may so tend, even if there are only a few similar ridge 
characteristics but it may, in such a case, have little weight. It may be excluded in the 
exercise of judicial discretion, if its prejudicial effect outweighs its probative value." 
Rose L.J. proceeded to lay down guidelines as to the circumstances in which fingerprint 
evidence should be excluded in the exercise of discretion. These included an indication that 
evidence was unlikely to be admissible where there were fewer than eight similar ridge 
characteristics, and a list of factors to be taken into account when there are eight similar 
characteristics or more. The eight-point threshold was arguably ill-conceived, given that the 
judgement otherwise dispensed with arbitrary numerical standards, and it may well be 
honoured largely in the breach35; but its importance in this context is that it is a clear 
precedent for the Court of Appeal laying down guidelines on how the common-law 
discretion36 should be exercised. If the judges were so minded, there is no reason why they 
should not in some future case lay down guidelines modelled on those proposed by the Law 
Commission. 
It is the central argument of this article that the exclusionary discretion could and should be 
used to exclude any prosecution evidence which would fail the Law Commission’s core test: 
that is, evidence that is not soundly based or is expressed in terms stronger than is warranted 
by whatever sound basis it has. If the evidence has no sound basis at all, it is irrelevant. If it is 
expressed in unduly strong terms, it has no probative value beyond what it would have if 
expressed in appropriately modest terms, and its unduly strong expression has a prejudicial 
effect: a jury that accepts it will be led to exclude or undervalue the possibility that the 
evidence is erroneous or can be explained in a way consistent with the accused’s innocence. 
Thus, prosecution expert evidence that is stronger than its basis warrants is always*Crim. 
L.R. 566  evidence whose prejudicial effect exceeds its probative value, or at least the 
probative value of its excessively strong element. 
The effect of applying the exclusionary discretion in this way would be similar to that of the 
Law Commission’s core test: very little of the evidence typically relied upon by the 
prosecution would be wholly inadmissible, but the courts would have to edit the evidence to 
ensure that it was not expressed in an unduly strong manner. Little evidence would be wholly 
inadmissible because even the weakest forms of forensic "science" evidence (what Saks calls 
the "non-science forensic sciences")37 have a sufficiently "sound" basis to qualify as relevant 
and of more than minimal probative value. The assumption underlying most evidence of this 
kind is that if two samples or images show many similarities and few if any differences, they 
are more likely to come from the same source than they would be if they showed fewer 
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similarities and more differences. As a broad generalisation, that is surely true. The trouble 
with the weaker forms of forensic science evidence is that no-one can say with any precision 
how much more likely the similarities are if the source is the same, or in other words how 
likely two samples or images from different sources are to show the relevant degree of 
similarity.38 The controversial question, to be taken up later in this article, is whether such 
uncertainty is a ground for excluding the evidence altogether, or simply (as I shall argue) for 
doing everything possible to make the uncertainty clear to the jury. 
The role of the judge in preventing evidence from being given in unduly strong terms was 
recognised by the Court of Appeal in Reed and Reed, when discussing the evidence of an 
expert as to how the minute traces of DNA that had been found might have been deposited:  
"care must be taken to guard against the dangers of that evaluation being tainted with the 
verisimilitude of scientific certainty … It is … essential … that the court exercise a firm 
degree of control over the admissibility of this type of evidence … The evidence on the 
possibilities and the evaluation must be clearly set out in full in the terms in which it is to be 
given. Where there is a challenge to its admissibility, the court must rule on the issue of 
admissibility in advance, or at the outset of the trial …".39  
This clearly indicates that the judge can and should "edit" the evidence at the pre-trial or voir 
dire stage, and insist that it is not presented in terms that lend it an unwarranted 
"verisimilitude of scientific certainty".40 Reed also stresses the importance of adherence to 
what are now the Criminal Procedure Rules 2012. In another case on DNA evidence, C, 
Thomas L.J. said that:  
"If the rules and guidance are properly observed, there are likely to be few cases where a voir 
dire will be necessary to determine whether the Crown’s expert evidence in relation to DNA 
should be excluded under s.78 of PACE.*Crim. L.R. 567 " 41  
The implication is that where the Rules are not observed, exclusion under s.78 (or the 
common law discretion [as preserved by s.82(3)]) may need to be considered. Of particular 
relevance are two paragraphs of r.33.3(1), which state that an expert’s report must:  
"(f) where there is a range of opinion on the matters dealt with in the report —  
(i) summarise the range of opinion; and 
(ii) give reasons for his own opinion; 
(g) if the expert is not able to give his opinion without qualification, state the qualification." 
In para.(g), "not able" must mean "not able consistently with the expert’s duty to the court", 
which under r.33.2(1) is to give an "objective, unbiased opinion". Any unduly strong opinion 
could be said to show a bias towards certainty, or to be more certain than can be objectively 
justified. Rule 33 thus provides an additional basis for the exclusion of unduly strong 
evidence under s.78. 
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It appears, then, that the main effect of the Law Commission’s "core test", that of excluding 
evidence expressed in excessively strong terms, could be achieved by applying existing 
common-law and statutory powers. I now want to argue that this interpretation of the law 
rests on sound moral and epistemic principles. 
How the jury knows  
An important principle underpinning the case law on expert evidence is that it is for the jury 
to determine what weight to give to expert evidence.42 The weight of expert evidence, in 
other words, is the persuasive force that it has from the standpoint of a jury of ordinary 
citizens. The jury must be able to say "in the first-person-plural voice of representatives of 
the … polity"43 whether the expert and other evidence together has made them sure of guilt. 
This democratic principle44 has important epistemological implications. In brief, it implies 
that verdicts must be justified on grounds that are cognitively accessible to jurors (and to 
citizens at large).45  
In light of the literature on both the epistemology of testimony and the psychology of fact-
finding, it seems clear that these cognitively accessible grounds must largely depend on a 
form of "inference to the best explanation", modified to comply with the relevant standard of 
proof.46 A jury is likely to accept—and to be justified in accepting—the theory (or "story")47 
that provides the most coherent*Crim. L.R. 568  and plausible explanation of the evidence.48 
To be accepted as proof of guilt in a criminal trial a theory must not only be more probable 
than its rivals; it must be the only coherent and plausible explanation of the evidence.49 The 
assessment of any particular piece of testimony—in a courtroom as in innumerable everyday 
situations where we believe or doubt what others tell us—can also be understood as a form of 
inference to the best explanation. The most obvious explanation of someone’s telling us 
something will usually be that she is saying what she honestly believes, and believes for good 
reasons; but sometimes other explanations will be available, such as the speaker’s having a 
motive to deceive, or her judgment being distorted by bias or by over-confidence in her 
cognitive abilities. Which of these explanations we accept may depend largely on how well 
the testimony coheres with other evidence and with our background knowledge and beliefs.50  
Expert evidence differs from other testimony by virtue of the scope that expert witnesses are 
given to draw inferences from their observations or from the evidence of other witnesses. 
Often these inferences will themselves be of an explanatory nature—e.g., that the similarities 
between two prints can only plausibly be explained by their coming from the same source, or 
the deaths of two young children of the same mother are most likely due to murder. To some 
extent, fact finders may be able to make their own assessment of the plausibility of these 
inferences. Jurors can, for example, see photographs or enlargements of fingerprints51 for 
themselves, although their interpretation of them will be guided by the expert. As with any 
other kind of testimony, jurors must assess whether the witness says what she does because 
she believes it for good reasons, or whether there are less creditable explanations for her 
saying it, such as bias, incompetence or dishonesty. But while this may the same kind of 
judgment as a jury has to make about any witness, it is likely to be a much more difficult one. 
Alternative inferences that might be drawn from the evidence available to the expert are 
unlikely to be readily apparent to the jury unless the expert herself, or another expert, points 
them out; and the ways in which error or bias can affect expert evidence are unlikely to be 
apparent unless they are themselves the subject of expert evidence (as the errors made by 
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expert lip-readers were in Luttrell,52 for example). Expert evidence can distort fact-finding—
producing a prejudicial effect—where it unjustifiably discounts alternative explanations, 
which are consequently ignored by the jury. 
This danger is clearly illustrated in the examples that the Law Commission itself gives of 
expert evidence leading to miscarriages of justice. In Dallagher,53 a purported expert on ear-
prints*Crim. L.R. 569   
"opined that he was ‘absolutely convinced’ that D had left the print found at the scene, and a 
second prosecution expert was willing to countenance only a ‘remote possibility’ that the 
print had been left by someone else." 54  
In Clark (Sally) (No 2) 55 C’s convictions for the murder of her two infant sons were quashed 
primarily because of the failure on the part of a prosecution expert to disclose test results for 
one of the deceased children which would have revealed the possibility of a natural cause; 
and another  
"expert had simply (and quite wrongly) assumed that there were no genetic or environmental 
factors affecting the likelihood of cot deaths, and testified that in his opinion there was only a 
one in 73 million chance of having two cot deaths in the same family." 56  
In Cannings the same expert expressed what the Court of Appeal later deplored as a dogmatic 
view that two or more infant deaths in the same family pointed to murder; subsequent 
evidence indicated a possible genetic cause.57 Similarly in Harris 58 the Court of Appeal 
criticised the over-confident assumption that the "triad" of injuries found in the deceased 
babies could only be explained by shaking. 
In all these cases, the problem was not so much the admission of the expert evidence as the 
exclusion by the experts of facts or possibilities that ought to have been left for the jury’s 
consideration. By either failing to mention, or effectively ruling out, possibilities favourable 
to the defence, the evidence had a prejudicial effect which, had the courts detected it, might 
reasonably have been held to outweigh its probative value. This reinforces the point made in 
Reed,59 about the need for judges to scrutinise carefully the way in which experts propose to 
give their evidence before it is placed before the jury. It also shows how vital it is that expert 
witnesses adhere to high ethical standards of candour and transparency,60 and are held to 
account (as were both the delinquent experts in the Clark (Sally) (No 2) case)61 when they fall 
short of those standards. But the fact that an expert’s findings are susceptible to more than 
one explanation looks like a reason for the expert to give more information to the jury, rather 
than a reason to exclude her evidence altogether. Provided the expert fairly places all 
possibilities of doubt before the jury, the jury can consider them in the context of the 
evidence as a whole. To quote Reed again:  
"… most expert witnesses in criminal cases [express their] opinion in relation to one specific 
aspect of the evidence. It is always for the jury to decide the facts in the light of the evidence 
as a whole. Whilst they must of course pay*Crim. L.R. 570  due regard to the expertise of an 
expert witness, they are neither obliged to agree with him, nor obliged to share doubts or 
reservations expressed by him." 62  
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In the Reed case, the audio consultant who analysed a voicemail left by the deceased had 
properly accepted that he could not be certain that what could be heard was a human being 
moaning and groaning, but the jury, taking into account other evidence about the time and 
circumstances of the call, could reasonably have been sure that these were the groans of a 
dying man. 
In the controversial case of Atkins,63 it was important to make the jury aware of the 
limitations of "facial mapping" evidence which placed one of the accused at the scene of the 
crime—and it is debatable whether those limitations were made as "crystal clear"64 as they 
could have been. On the other hand, the jury were entitled to consider the expert evidence in 
the context of the strong circumstantial evidence implicating the accused, including his close 
association with someone who was undoubtedly involved but had died before the trial. If the 
expert evidence had been excluded on the ground that it was not "demonstrably reliable",65 
the jury would have been deprived of relevant evidence which could have made the 
difference between their having a reasonable doubt and their being sure. And as Hughes L.J. 
pointed out, a ruling that the expert could not comment on the strength of the evidence but 
merely point out similarities to the jury would equally preclude the expert’s expressing a 
properly cautious view of the evidence, for example that it lent only "limited support" to an 
identification, where that was appropriate.66  
Possible drawbacks  
In suggesting that the Law Commission’s proposals do not differ greatly from the effect of a 
common law approach which takes seriously the potentially prejudicial effect of expert 
evidence, I am not (unlike Adam Wilson)67 suggesting that the existing law, strictly applied, 
would be preferable to implementation of the Law Commission recommendations. The 
advantages of the Law Commission’s proposals lie in their clarity, in the occasion that new 
legislation would afford for judicial training (though the cost of this exercise may well put the 
government off implementing them), and perhaps most importantly, in the provision for 
independent experts to advise judges on admissibility decisions.68 These are significant 
points, and in the absence of training, independent experts, or legislation much will depend 
on the ability and willingness of the Court of Appeal to formulate suitable guidance; but the 
disadvantages of the existing exclusionary discretion by comparison with*Crim. L.R. 
571  the legislative solution favoured by the Commission are less substantial than the 
Commission supposed. 
In its Consultation Paper, the Law Commission firmly rejected the option of a judicial 
discretion without guidance, or without more guidance than the "equivocal, and inconsistent, 
pronouncements of the Court of Appeal".69 The court is, however, perfectly capable of giving 
clear guidance as to specific forms of evidence, as it has done in Buckley,70 Henderson 71 (on 
the "triad" of injuries in "shaken baby" cases), Luttrell 72 (on lip-reading), Atkins 73 (on 
forensic facial identification) Smith 74 (revisiting fingerprints) and Reed and Reed 75; and 
there is nothing to stop it from giving general guidance on the use of the discretionary 
powers. It could do much worse than to model such guidance on that proposed by the Law 
Commission. 
The Commission’s main objection to a discretionary exclusionary power with guidance was 
that it would be reviewable by the Court of Appeal only on Wednesbury 76 grounds. The 
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Commission saw this as an inappropriate standard because the Court of Appeal was "better 
suited than trial judges to resolve questions relating to the evidentiary reliability of expert 
evidence".77  
The Commission is correct to point out that there is authority78 for the proposition that the 
judge’s exercise of the s.78 discretion is reviewable only on Wednesbury grounds. On the 
other hand Lord Steyn, speaking for a unanimous House of Lords, has said that although s.78  
"is formally cast in the form of a discretion (‘the court may’) the objective criterion whether 
‘the evidence would have such an adverse effect on the fairness of the proceedings’ in truth 
imports a judgment whether in the light of the statutory criterion of fairness the court ought to 
admit the evidence." 79  
Whether expert evidence is expressed more strongly than its foundations warrant is a matter 
of judgment, rather than discretion, and once it is established that the proposed evidence is 
too strong it must follow that the non-existent probative value of the excessively strong 
element of the evidence is outweighed by its inevitable prejudicial effect. Even on a 
Wednesbury basis, it should be possible to argue either that the judge has failed to take 
account of the lack of foundation for the way the opinion is stated, or if the judge did take it 
into account, that no reasonable judge could then fail to exclude the evidence. 
A further disadvantage of the existing discretion, rightly noted by the Law Commission, is 
that it does not place the burden of persuasion on the proponent*Crim. L.R. 572  of expert 
evidence, as the Draft Bill would do.80 Although the Court of Appeal has indicated that the 
burden of proving the admissibility of expert evidence lies on the proponent of the 
evidence,81 these dicta are not concerned with the discretionary power of exclusion, but with 
the need for the proponent of the evidence to show that it falls within the expert evidence 
exception to the rule excluding opinion evidence. The burden on the proponent is to show 
that the evidence has more than minimal probative value and is "helpful" to the jury, but not 
to show that its probative value exceeds its prejudicial effect. 
According to the Court of Appeal in R. (on the application of Saifi) v Governor of Brixton 
Prison, "the concept of a burden of proof has no part to play" where evidence is challenged 
under s.78; rather, each side seeks to persuade the court of its view of the impact of the 
evidence on the fairness of the proceedings.82 Presumably the same applies to the common-
law discretion: the proponent of the evidence bears the burden of proving its probative value, 
the opponent that of proving its prejudicial effect, and it is for the court to determine the 
balance between the two. Pattenden has criticized the reasoning in Saifi but her arguments 
concern allegations of police misconduct rather than the questions of probative value and 
prejudicial effect.83 A stricter insistence on the proponent’s burden to show the probative 
value of the evidence would go some way towards removing what appears to be a tactical, if 
not a legal, burden on the opponent of the evidence to show its unreliability.84  
From the Commission’s standpoint, a major drawback of both s.78 and the common law 
discretion85 is that they apply only to prosecution evidence. The Commission’s view is that 
the same test should apply to both prosecution and defence evidence, although the burden of 
standard of proof should be taken into account in determining what is a "sufficient" standard 
of reliability.86 As noted above, while the Sang 87 discretion does not apply to defence 
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evidence, a related "relevance versus effect"88 test does—namely Turner 89 "helpfulness". 
Roberts and Zuckerman, indeed, see Turner as no more than a localized version "PV > PE", 
their shorthand for the Sang discretion.90 Turner, however, is concerned with evidence on 
matters where the jury could form an opinion for themselves. It does not appear apposite to 
cases such as the supposed "temporary brittle bone disease"91 where the expert evidence is 
outside the scientific mainstream but is not on a matter of "common knowledge". The Court 
of Appeal has indicated, though without deciding the point, that evidence of "temporary 
brittle bone disease" may well be insufficiently reliable to be admitted.92 If this is taken to 
mean that such evidence*Crim. L.R. 573  is of so little probative value that no reasonable 
jury could attach significant weight to it,93 then this does appear the appropriate test to apply. 
In principle, any evidence, however speculative or controversial, to which a reasonable jury 
could attach more than negligible weight should be admissible on the basis that it could cause 
the jury to have a reasonable doubt. Experts called by the defence should not, however, have 
carte blanche to give evidence in unjustifiably strong terms. The argument that such 
overstated evidence adds nothing to the probative value that the evidence would have if stated 
more cautiously applies equally to defence and prosecution evidence. 
In its discussion of the Criminal Procedure Rules, the Court in Reed 94 drew particular 
attention to r.33.6, which gives the judge power to direct experts called by the prosecution 
and defence to confer and to "prepare a statement for the court of the matters on which they 
agree and disagree, giving their reasons".95 The judge can then rule on the admissibility of the 
experts’ evidence on the matters on which they disagree. If a defence expert were to state an 
opinion that went beyond anything for which scientifically cogent reasons could be given 
(e.g. by attempting to portray "temporary brittle bone disease" as an established fact) the 
judge would surely be entitled—indeed bound—to rule that an opinion expressed in those 
terms fell outside the Folkes v Chadd exception to the rule against opinion evidence, which 
applies to "the reasonings of men of science" on matters within their science.96 The same 
would apply to a defence expert like the one in the Canadian case of J (J-L),97 who simply 
refused to discussed the reasoning on which his conclusion was purportedly based. 
The argument for the inadmissibility of purportedly expert opinion which lacks any reasoned 
basis also applies, of course, to prosecution evidence, and confirms that the exclusion of such 
evidence in clear cases is not purely a matter of discretion. This is not to say that the test 
would be fully symmetrical. A defence report could not be excluded, for example, because it 
failed to consider a hypothesis favouring the prosecution, although the equivalent failing in a 
prosecution report could be considered unfairly prejudicial. 
Was the Commission too timid?  
The argument that the common law is capable of being developed in such a way as to deliver 
most of what the Law Commission recommends may seem to play into the hands of those 
critics of the Law Commission who argue that its proposals are flawed precisely because they 
make no radical change to the existing law. For these critics, the Law Commission’s 
willingness to countenance the admission of quite dubious forms of forensic "science" such 
as ear-printing and facial mapping, provided their conclusions are expressed in suitably 
modest terms, is a serious weakness. From a purely epistemic point of view, however, the 
admissibility of such evidence seems justified. Prima facie, any evidence which there is a 
This is a pre-copyedited, author-produced version of an article accepted for publication in criminal law review following peer review. The 
definitive published version Crim. L.R. 2013, 7, 561-576 is available online on Westlaw UK or from Thomson Reuters DocDel service . 
 
 
good reason to believe has more than a chance relationship to the existence of a 
material*Crim. L.R. 574  fact is relevant evidence which a fact-finder should take into 
account—provided the fact-finder also takes into account the possibility of error or 
coincidence. Edmond and Roberts see "no epistemic advantages, but rather only potential 
disadvantages, in admitting incriminating opinions that are not demonstrably reliable".98 Yet 
the techniques they regard as "not demonstrably reliable", such as "facial mapping", are 
almost certainly relevant—the world would have to be a very strange place for the similarities 
and differences discerned by forensic identification techniques to have no bearing on the 
question whether the items examined came from a common source. As Michael Pardo argues, 
there is always an epistemic advantage in taking account of relevant evidence99; the more 
complete one’s evidence, the better founded will be any inferences inductively drawn from 
it100 (including inferences to the best explanation). On the other hand, admission of relevant 
evidence may have countervailing disadvantages if lay fact-finders have an inherent tendency 
to over-value it (as is arguably the case with unreliable confessions and some character 
evidence). Exclusion may also be justified as an incentive for the parties—or the state—to 
ensure the production of better evidence, i.e. scientific evidence that can be clearly 
demonstrated to be reliable.101  
Both these grounds for exclusion can be invoked in the case of expert evidence that is not 
"demonstrably reliable". Juries might accord such evidence more deference than it deserves. 
While this is undeniably a risk, the available research (though much of it concerns US juries 
in civil trials) gives little support to the stereotype of jurors as blindly deferential to expert 
evidence.102 Juries can certainly be led astray by expert evidence presented in misleading 
terms,103 but that is precisely what controls on excessively strong expert evidence seek to 
avoid. 
Excluding evidence that was not "demonstrably reliable" would undeniably give a strong 
incentive to state agencies to commission research demonstrating reliability.104 But so too 
could a firm insistence that experts’ duties to the court required them to qualify their evidence 
by drawing the jury’s attention to the lack of testing of the underlying techniques and 
assumptions. This seems an easier approach to justify than the outright exclusion of relevant 
evidence in the absence of any impropriety on the part of the individual expert or the party 
tendering the evidence, except to the extent that the Crown can notionally be held responsible 
for failing to commission more extensive research. 
Edmond and Roberts argue that "Admissibility decision-making should be independent of 
other evidence and considerations. … For admissibility expert*Crim. L.R. 575  opinions must 
stand or fall on their own."105 Strictly speaking, the Law Commission appears to have 
conflated the admissibility and the sufficiency of evidence. How strong an opinion the expert 
can properly express is indeed a matter that can be determined without regard to the other 
evidence in the case. If there is little or no other evidence, however, a decision that a 
strongly-worded opinion is inadmissible will be fatal to the prosecution’s chance of making 
out a prima facie case, and so in effect will result in the complete exclusion of the evidence. 
Where there is sufficient evidence to amount to a case to answer even though the expert 
opinion is cautiously worded, the effect of the ruling will be to edit the evidence rather than 
exclude it altogether. In considering the sufficiency of evidence it is important to bear in 
mind the distinction drawn by Lord Mustill in Daley between cases where the weight to be 
given to the evidence depends on the jury’s assessment of the truthfulness of the witness, and 
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cases where the basis of the evidence is too weak to satisfy the standard of proof, however 
sincerely confident the witness might be.106  
When exercising the Sang discretion, however, it is not so clear as Edmond and Roberts take 
it to be that admissibility decisions cannot properly take account of other evidence that 
provides the context for the particular piece of evidence in question. In a model that takes 
inference to the best explanation to be central to the evaluation of evidence, the probative 
value of a piece of evidence depends on what can be inferred from it in conjunction with 
other pieces of evidence that fit a given explanatory theory.107 Edmond and Roberts’ position 
appears more consistent with a Bayesian approach which equates the probative value of 
evidence with its likelihood ratio: i.e. how much more (or less) likely the relevant evidence is 
to exist if the prosecution hypothesis is true than it is if the defence hypothesis is true.108 Yet 
within a Bayesian framework, it is debatable whether the probative value of a piece of 
evidence should be equated simply with its likelihood ratio, or should take account of the 
prior probability of the hypothesis in question.109 For example, if the likelihood ratio of the 
evidence is 100:1, does it have the same probative value whether it increases the probability 
of guilt from 0.0001 to 0.01, or from 0.5 to approximately 0.99? Even if we accept the 
equivalence of probative value and likelihood ratio, we certainly need to take account of the 
prior probability of guilt when assessing the potential prejudicial effect of the evidence, 
because one of the gravest kinds of prejudicial effect is that the jury may commit the 
"prosecutor’s fallacy" by ignoring the prior odds against guilt. For example, if as in Hookway 
110 the expert on whose evidence the entire prosecution case rests concedes that there might 
be one other person in Manchester who resembles a photograph as closely as the accused, the 
jury might forget that it has no reason to consider the accused more likely than the 
hypothetical Mancunian (or a hypothetical Liverpudlian for that matter) to have committed 
the crime. If, as*Crim. L.R. 576  Redmayne has suggested,111 the jury discounted the prior 
probability of innocence because they assumed the police had some reason to single out the 
defendant from the population of Manchester, that is just another form of prejudicial effect; 
no-one should be convicted on the basis of speculation about police suspicions. 
When a weak form of forensic evidence such as "facial mapping" is the sole evidence against 
a defendant, so that the prior probability of guilt is tiny (the accused is just one among 
millions of potential culprits), the prejudicial effect of overlooking the prior odds will be 
extremely serious. The situation is different in a case like Atkins,112 where it was common 
ground that two robberies and a murder were committed by one Carty, who had since died, 
and two associates. Since the Atkins brothers were closely associated with Carty, they were 
among a relatively small pool of possible suspects and the prior odds against their guilt 
cannot have been very great, even before taking account of the other circumstantial evidence 
linking them to the crime. This context surely makes a big difference to the balance between 
probative value and prejudicial effect. 
Alongside their proposal for a test for admissibility based on "demonstrable reliability" 
Edmond and Roberts argue for a "Multidisciplinary Advisory Panel" (MAP) to advise the 
courts on which forms of evidence are or are not "demonstrably reliable".113 The MAP could 
play a valuable role in conjunction with a more flexible test of admissibility, by informing the 
courts about the range of opinion in different areas of forensic science, the potential for error 
and evidence of (un)reliability of various techniques, and other matters of which judges 
should ensure that experts inform juries in their evidence-in-chief. 
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The Law Commission report does not envisage a draconian clampdown on the many forensic 
techniques whose reliability is less than certain; rather it aims to prevent juries from being 
deceived about how certain the results of those techniques really are. But that is a result that 
the courts should have been able to achieve—and still could achieve, if the report remains on 
the shelf—by a strict interpretation to the existing law. The key is to recognise that, to the 
extent that expert evidence too categorically favours a hypothesis favourable to the 
prosecution, or unjustifiably rules out or ignores alternative explanations, it is evidence 
whose prejudicial effect exceeds its probative value. That is consistent with the common-law 
view that it is ultimately for the jury to assess the weight of expert evidence in the context of 
the case as a whole—provided that there is some rational basis on which a jury could 
conclude that the evidence as a whole is sufficient to prove guilt to the criminal standard. It 
remains to be seen whether, in the absence of legislation to implement the Law Commission 
report, the Court of Appeal will show any inclination to move in this direction—and it must 
be admitted that its record to date does not inspire unqualified confidence. But the path to a 
rigorous application of the common law tests is open, and it should be taken. 
Tony Ward  
Law School, University of Hull  
Crim. L.R. 2013, 7, 561-576 
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